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CASE NOTES
Administrative Law—Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act—Minimum
Wage Determination for Different Occupations Within an Industry
Held Invalid.—Barber Coleman Co. v. Wirtz.'—In a suit instituted against
the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Walsh-Healey
Act,a eleven manufacturers of machine tools sought a declaratory judg-
ment that a final determination of the prevailing minimum wages in the
machine tools industry, made by the Secretary under Section 1(b) of the
Walsh-Healey Act,3 was unlawful and void. A permanent injunction was
also sought enjoining the Secretary and his agents from enforcing or apply-•
ing that determination. By his final decision," the Secretary had determined
two different prevailing minimum wages for the machine tools industry; one
in the amount of $1.65 an hour for blueprint machine operators and drafts-
men, and another for $1.80 an hour for those employees engaged in other
occupations within the same industry. 5 Notice of a hearing by the Labor
Department to determine the prevailing minimum wages in the machine
tools industry was published in the Federal Register.° It requested evidence
to be submitted as to the prevailing minimum wages in the industry and
the minimum wage paid to "covered workers."7 This notice of hearing con-
tained no suggestion that evidence be produced with respect to wages paid
according to occupations and none was submitted. As a result of the hear-
1 224 F. Supp. 137 (D.D.C. 1963).
2 66 Stat. 308 (1952), 41 U.S.C. § 43a(b) (1958). Known as the Fulbright
Amendment, this section makes the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act,
60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011 (1958), calling for judicial review, applicable
to Sections 1-5 and 7-9 of the Walsh-Healey Act.
49 Stat. 2036 (1936), 41 U.S.C. § 35(b) (1958). Under this section, employers
who manufacture or supply goods, materials, supplies, and equipment under government
contracts for amounts exceeding $10,000, must stipulate to certain wage requirements:
That all persons employed by the contractor . . will be paid . . . not less
than the minimum wages as determined by the Secretary of Labor to be the
prevailing minimum wages for persons employed on similar work or in
the particular or similar industries or groups of industries currently operating
in the locality. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
4 28 Fed. Reg. 4898 (1963).
5 A preliminary injunction had been granted previously to the companies' restraining
the Secretary from enforcing the prevailing minimum wage determination on the basis
of doubt as to the validity of such determination. Barber-Coleman Co. v. Wirtz, 16
WM Cases 120 (D.D.C. 1963).
8 26 Fed. Reg. 7550 (1961). See generally, 68 Dick. L. Rev. 74 (1963).
A government contractor's stipulation as to minimum wages under Section 1(b)
of the Walsh-Healey Act applies not to all persons in his employ but only to those
engaged in the manufacture or furnishing of the particular material or equipment called
for by his contract. Those so engaged are called "covered workers." Thus, in the
case of a company having a government contract to manufacture a machine tool, the
receptionist in the office of the president of the company would not be subject to the
minimum pursuant to the stipulation, or if that company were also engaged in enter-
prises other than the manufacture of machine tools, the wages of its employees would
not be subject to that minimum since they would not be "covered workers." Perkins
v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 128 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd, 317 U.S. 501 (1943).
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ings and after publishing a tentative decision, 8 the Secretary concluded that
a determination providing for one prevailing minimum wage for blueprint
machine operators and draftsmen, and another for all other minimum wage
workers in the machine tools industry was both authorized by the Walsh-
Healey Act and warranted by the evidence. The procedural infirmities
alleged by plaintiffs were that the notice and hearing requirements of the
Walsh-Healey Act and the Administrative Procedure Act were not complied
with and that plaintiffs were not given a full hearing as required by both
acts.9
 However, it was the determination of different minimum wages for
workers in different occupations in the industry which was the substantive
'error alleged by plaintiffs. 10 The court HELD• Plaintiffs' motion for sum-
mary judgment granted. As a matter of law, the determination by the
Secretary was not authorized by Section 1(b) of the Walsh-Healey Act un-
der which the Secretary purported to act. Under the notice of hearing, the
industry was entitled to proceed on the assumption that the hearing would
relate to all covered workers and the minimum wages as determined would
be based upon evidence of the actual minimum in the industry. However,
the final determination was based upon evidence which did not include
all covered workers. The failure to include blueprint machine operators and
draftsmen, usually at the low side of the industry wage scale, as covered
workers in determining the prevailing minimum wages for all other occupa-
tions within the industry, was prejudicial to the industry.
The Walsh-Healey Act provides that every contract with an agency
of the United States for the manufacture or furnishing of supplies or equip-
ment in an amount exceeding $10,000 shall include a stipulation as to mini-
mum wages as determined by the Secretary of Labor 11 Enacted in 1936,
8 27 Fed. Reg. 898 (1962).
9 Another procedural infirmity alleged by plaintiffs was that the defendant failed
to make adequate findings and state sufficient reasons as required by Section 8(b) of
the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 242 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1007(b) ( 1958),
which provides in part that:
All decisions shall . . . indude a statement of (1) findings and conclusions,
as well as the reasons or basis therefor, upon all the material issues of fact,
law, or discretion presented on the record. . . .
It was further alleged that defendant's action in making the determination effective
seven days after publication in the Federal Register without a finding of good cause did
not comply with the requirement of Section 4(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act,
60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § I003(c) (1958), which provides that an agency rule
shall be published:
. . . Mot less than thirty days prior to the effective date thereof except as
otherwise provided by the agency upon good cause found and published with
the rule.
10 Supra note 1, at 139.
11 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), as amended, 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1958). It should be
noted that the Act does not provide that the Secretary fix minimum wages; he has
no power analogous to that of a rate-making agency, such as the Interstate Commerce
Commission, which is delegated broad discretion to fix reasonable freight rates.
He merely makes the determination of what is the prevailing minimum. This is not
a discretionary determination but a determination of a specific fact.
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the purpose of the Act was to prevent use of public funds to depress work-
ing conditions and to use the leverage of the government's immense pur-
chasing power to raise labor standards. 12 Unlike the Fair Labor Standards
Act,'s Walsh-Healey does not specify a blanket minimum for all industries.
Instead, determinations of prevailing minimum wages are made for individual
industries. Walsh-Healey provides that it will not apply to any contracts
except those relating to such industries as have been the subject matter of
a determination by the Secretary of Labor. The prevailing minimum wages
determined by the Secretary may be considerably higher than the highest
minimum permitted under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Section 10(b) of Walsh-Healey provides: "All wage determinations
under section 1(b) . . . shall be made on the record after opportunity for a
hearing." 14 Thus the Secretary must make a factual determination of what
is the actual prevailing minimum wage on the basis of evidence of wages
actually paid, which evidence is to be "on the record after opportunity for
a hearing." He must do so in a manner consistent with the requirements of
the Administrative Procedure Act as to notice, hearing and other procedural
matters, since the provisions of this Act govern conduct under Sections 1-5
and 7-9 of Walsh-Healey. 16 These provisions insure full disclosure of the
basis for wage determinations and provide a delay in the effective date of
the order to allow exceptions to be considered in judicial review proceed-
ings brought by any manufacturer in the industry to which the determina-
tion is applicable. 16
In Walsh-Healey hearings, the Labor Department's evidence of pre-
vailing minimum wages is gathered and presented by representatives of the
Department's Bureau of Labor Statistics (hereinafter BLS). Since the Act
requires the minimum wages norm to be that existing in the industry at the
time, the BLS attempts to secure information as to the minimum wages
paid in all establishments in an industry. It sends a questionnaire to all
known industry members, and its field representatives visit companies that
do not respond to questionnaires. The answers to its inquiries are kept se-
cret by the BLS, but it collates the information and introduces it in summary
form into the record indicating which wages are at the lower end of the
12 United States v. New England Coal and Coke Co., 318 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1963).
13 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 203-217 (Supp. IV, 1959-62). This Act is the principal federal law regulating wages,
hours of work, and the employment of child labor. The minimum wage regulation,
when determined, applies to all employees, not specifically exempt, who are engaged
in interstate commerce or the production of goods for commerce, or who are employed
by an enterprise engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce.
14 66 Stat. 308 (1952), 41 U.S.C. 43a(b) (1958).
15 Ibid.
16 To obtain standing for judicial review, a manufacturer, although not under
government contract, must be in the industry affected by the determination. He must
also be able to show, by direct and immediate injury, to have been affected or aggrieved
by the Secretary's determination. Mitchell v. Covington Mills, 229 F.2d 506, 511 (D.C.
Cir. 1955); cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1002 (1956).
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industry's wage scale, how.many workers receive lower wages, what the
occupational groupings are, and other information of a similar nature which
will throw light on the minimum wage structure of the industry."
The legislative history of Walsh-Healey and its administrative inter-
pretation indicate that the Secretary has no power under section 1(b) to
impose minimum wages for each occupation or groups of occupations, but
only a single minimum for all of the regular covered employees of the
contractor." In 1937, the very next year after the adoption of the Walsh-
Healey Act, a case arose before Secretary of Labor Perkins in which the
unions argued that the Act empowered the secretary to determine different
minimum wages for different occupations when making a wage determination
for a particular industry." At the hearing, evidence was submitted by the
unions indicating several definite occupational classifications of workers within
the men's hat and cap industry. The unions urged the establishment of dif-
ferent minimum wages for each such classification. The Secretary rejected the
contention, emphasizing that her view was taken on advice from her Solicitor's
office that, " [T]he Act authorizes the fixing of only one minimum wage in an
industry and does not permit the establishment of occupational minima."'
(Emphasis supplied.) Such a contention as that of the union failed to con-
sider that the Secretary has not been given the power to regulate minimum
wages, but merely to make a factual determination of the prevailing mini-
mum wages that actually exist in the industry.
As the court indicated in the present case, Secretary Perkins' applica-
tion of Walsh-Healey at the outset of its twenty-eight year history has been
17 Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Administrative Procedure Rep. 24 (1940). Only BLS
has the means for securing such information on the most comprehensive basis. Some-
times a trade association conducts a questionnaire survey of its own, from which it
derives similar information, and introduces this information into the record in order to
provide a check on the BLS data. But, it is apparent that the BLS data provide not
only the point of departure for the evidentiary hearing but also the most extensive and
important evidence produced. For a detailed analysis of early wage determinations,
see Comment, 48 Yale L.J. 610 (1939).
18 Congressman Healey explained that the wage provision in Section 1(b) of the
House Committee Bill (identical with the•Act as finally adopted) did not provide for
establishing different minimum wages for different occupational classes of employees
within an industry but only for a single minimum wage figure for all employees. His
remarks were:
This bill does not set the standard for minimum wages by reference to the
codes that obtained under N.R.A., but definitely sets it as the prevailing
minimum wage for similar work or in the industries operating in the locality
in which the contract is to be performed. The bill merely provides for a proper
determination by the Secretary of Labor with respect to such prevailing wage.
After that determination has been made the figure will be included in the
stipulations in these contracts. (Emphasis supplied.)
80 Cong. Rec. 10002 (1936) (remarks of Congressman Healey). See Comment, 48
Yale L.J. 610, 627 (1939).
10 Determination of the Prevailing Minimum Wages in the Men's Hat and Cap
Industry, 2 Fed. Reg. 1335 (1937).
20 Ibid. See also, Determination of the Prevailing Minimum Wages in the Tobacco
Industry, 4 Fed. Reg. 1664 (1939).
756
CASE NOTES
consistently adhered to by the Department. 21 The establishment of multiple
minima for an industry would be a departure from this record. Evidence of
this pattern of uniform interpretation is to be found in a very recent case
announced by the Secretary just as the present case reached the court on
the motion for a preliminary injunction. 22 In pending proceedings for
the engine and turbine industry, the union had advocated that two levels
of prevailing minimum wages be . established—one for the lowest paid oc-
cupations and another for the rest of the occupations in the industry. In his
tentative decision, the Secretary rejected the union's proposal and plainly
recognized its wholly unprecedented nature by characterizing it as—"the
innovation suggested."23
If the determination of different minimum wages for different occupa-
tions is not authorized by Section 1 (b) of Walsh-Healey, the question re-
mains whether such a determination is authorized by Section 1 (b) read in
conjunction with Section 6 of the same Act, which provides in part:
The Secretary of Labor may provide reasonable limitations and
may make rules and regulations allowing reasonable variations,
tolerances, and exemptions to and from any and all provisions of
this Act respecting minimum rates of pay .... 24
This was the position taken by the government at trial. The court rejected
such a contention because the government had not, at any time during the
determination hearings, purported to be acting under the provisions of
Section 6 of Walsh-Healey." It is submitted, however, that such a con-
tention is so inherently untenable and contrary to the legislative intent in
making  the Administrative Procedure Act applicable to the administration
of Walsh-Healey, that whether the Secretary purported to act under sec-
tion 6 would be irrelevant.
Section 6 is designed to permit the Secretary to "make rules and regula-
tions allowing reasonable variations, tolerances and exemptions to and from
any and all provisions of Walsh-Healey respecting minimum rates of pay!"2e
When acting under section 6, the Secretary is not required to base the rate
of minimum wages on a finding of the prevailing minimum wages for the
21 See, e.g., Tentative Decision Determining Prevailing Minimum Wages, Electronics
Equipment Industry, 27 Fed. Reg. 11282-83 (1962) (there can be only one lowest
or minimum wage in any one plant); Pumps and Compressors Industry, 27 Fed. Reg.
12962-63 (1962); Tires and Related Products Industry, 24 Fed. Reg. 8741-46 (1959).
22 Tentative Decision Determining Prevailing Minimum Wages, Engine and Turbine
Industry, 28 Fed. Reg. 6989 (1963).
28 Id. at 6991.
24 49 Stat. 2038 (1936), 41 U.S.C. § 40 (1958).
26 Supra note 8, at 900. In this tentative decision, the Secretary provided: "[Title
exemptive authority provided for by Section 6 of the Act, under which a tolerance for
beginners or probationary workers may be granted, will not be exercised."
26 Supra note 24. (Emphasis supplied.) Illustrative of the Regulations promulgated
are: 41 C.F.R. iI 50-201.1102 (1963) (tolerance for handicapped workers); 	 50-201.1103
(1963) (tolerance for apprentices);
	
50-202.3 (1963) (learners employed at less than
the minimum wage).
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workers covered by the tolerance such as he is required to make under
section 1(b) 27 The formal rule-making procedures such as notice and state-
ment of findings, as well as provisions for judicial review, of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act were not made applicable to section 6 by the Ful-
bright Amendment of 1952.28 Since the enactment of Walsh-Healey, the
provisions of section 6 have been invoked by the Secretary only with respect
to employees who were not regular workers or who were beginners, proba-
tionary workers, helpers or auxiliary workers." Even in those instances, the
Secretary is limited to a reasonable variation or tolerance. Can it be said
that a determination of an additional prevailing minimum wage such as was
entered in the instant case is a reasonable variation? It is submitted that
the very reasons for making the Administrative Procedure Act applicable
in the administration of Walsh-Healey would be thwarted if the Secretary
could employ section 6 to substantiate his determination of different mini-
Section 10(b) of Walsh-Healey only makes reference to section 1(b), if the
mum wages for different occupations. Because the hearing provision of
Secretary were able to make a determination under section 6, then the
hearing provision would not be applicable to such determination. It could be
made without notice of hearing, without a hearing, and without a statement
of the reasons or basis for such determination. To sanction such a deter-
mination would be to invite arbitrariness and capriciousness. Indeed, if the
government's contention in this case were allowed to stand, it may well have
deprived plaintiffs of property without due process of law for these very
reasons. The manufacturers would have been confined to a wage deter-
mination made on a record which did not include rebuttal evidence because
there would be no "opportunity for hearing.""
In this case, the notice of hearing contained no suggestion that evidence
be produced with respect to wages paid according to occupations. It called
for the minimum wages paid according to "covered workers."' It follows
that if the stipulation as to minimum wages is to cover all of the workers of
the industry, save any tolerance for beginners or helpers, the evidence as
to wages on the basis of which the Secretary is to make his determination of
the prevailing minimum must include information as to wages paid to workers
27 22 Fed. Reg. 6226 (1957). Pursuant to section 6, the Secretary added a tolerance
for apprentices.
28 66 Stat. 308 (1952), 41 U.S.C. § 43a(b) (1958).
22 Comment, 48 Yale LT, supra note 17, at 627. For such special categories it
is well understood in industry that the normal prevailing minimum rate of wages is
not intended to be applicable. Where these categories exist to any significant extent,
industry usually provides subminimum wages. See 3 Fed. Reg. 224 (1938) (tolerance
established for auxiliary workers).
30 A party who has a sufficient interest or right at stake in a determination should
be entitled to an opportunity to know and to meet unfavorable evidence of adjudicative
facts with the weapons of rebuttal evidence, cross-examination, and argument. This trial-
type hearing is what the Administrative Procedure Act calls a determination on the record
after opportunity for a hearing. 1 Davis, Administrative Law § 7.02 (1958).
21 Supra note 1, at 139.
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of all types. In short, the "covered workers" to whom the minimum wage
determination is to apply must also be the "covered workers" as to whose
wages evidence is secured by the Secretary in order to determine what is in
fact the prevailing minimum. But the BLS data in this case were inadequate
in precisely this respect.32
 In the evidence presented on the record, data con-
cerning the wages paid to blueprint machine operators and draftsmen were
excluded." The determination of the $1.80 an hour prevailing minimum
wage did not include the actual wages paid to blueprint machine operators
and draftsmen—occupations in which, as has been earlier suggested, the
wages are usually low.34
 Failure to include these wage figures in the deter-
mination resulted in a higher minimum wage for all other occupations in the
machine tools industry than would have been determined had the wages of
these occupations been included." Rather than correcting this error by a
redetermination, the Secretary saw fit to mend the defective BLS survey
by making a different determination for blueprint machine operators and
draftsmen." If such a determination were to be held valid under Section 6
of Walsh-Healey, then the plaintiffs might well be deprived of property
without due process since the notice, hearing, and finding requirements of
Walsh-Healey and the Administrative Procedure Act would not have been
satisfied. In order to continue government business, the plaintiffs would
have to pay higher minimum wages without having been afforded the oppor-
tunity to present objections and contrasting or other relevant data.
This case represents an authoritative pronouncement that a determi-
nation of different minimum wages for different occupations within an
industry is not authorized by Section 1 (b) of the Walsh-Healey Act. How-
ever, its future importance rests upon the necessary conclusion that a deter-
32 The BLS questionnaire defined "covered workers" for whom plaintiff manu-
facturers were to provide wage information to include only all working foremen,
other workers engaged in processing, fabricating, assembling, handling, or shipping, and
all janitors working around machines while in operation. Plaintiffs were directed to
exclude other plant workers not mentioned under workers covered and office, sales,
executive, administrative and professional personnel. As a result, the wages paid to
blueprint machine operators and draftsmen, working in offices, were excluded from the
questionnaire. Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 14-15.
83 Brief for plaintiff, pp. 14-15.
84 At the hearing, a Labor Department official testified that the BLS questionnaire's
definition of "covered workers" was an abbreviated standard definition and that its
origin dated back before 1940. However, in the intervening twenty-four years, the
Secretary's rulings had expanded the concept of "covered workers" to include draftsmen
and blueprint machine operators. Id. at 16.
38 This failure would result in substantial injury to plaintiffs unless set aside, since
the wages of workers would have to be raised considerably. Id. at 24.
38 In the tentative decision, supra note 8, Secretary Goldberg (the present Secretary's
predecessor) recognized that the BLS survey had improperly omitted blueprint machine
operators and draftsmen from its coverage. Rather than reopening the record for the
introduction of additional evidence of the wages of the omitted workers (a relatively
common and effective practice in administrative hearings) he expediently determined
occupational minima. Nearly a year and a half went by before the issuance of the
final decision, supra note 4, which was made by the present Secretary and which stead-
fastly adhered to the former Secretary's method of mending the defective BLS survey
without reasoning to its conclusion. Id. at 17-18.
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mination of different minimum wages for different occupations, although
purportedly made under sections 1(b) and 6 as read in conjunction, will be
held invalid. Such determination would thwart legislative intent in providing
for an opportunty for a hearing, notice requirements and a statement of
findings before a valid wage determination could be reached. It would also
result in an infringement upon fundamental standards of due process in
failing to provide an opportunity to introduce evidence and to make argu-
ments/ GEORGE M. FORD
Communications Law—Communications Act of 1934—Right of a Party
in Interest to a Trial-type Hearing upon a Challenge to a License Appli-
cation.—Interstate Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 1—Interstate (hereinafter re-
ferred to as WQXR), a class I-B AM radio station operating at 50 kilowatts
on 1560 kc in New York City, challenged the applications for broadcasting
permits made by intervenors Patchogue and Grossco? The Commission
22 Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S.
1 (1938).
1 323 F.2d 797 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
2 In 1957, Patchogue applied for a construction permit to operate a new AM
station at Riverhead, Long Island, on 1570 kilocycles with a power of 1 kilowatt, to
broadcast daytime only. In 1959 the application was granted without a hearing. WQXR
filed a protest under § 309(c) of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1085, as
amended, ch. 879, § 7, 66 Stat. 715 (1952), ch. 1, 70 Stat. 3 (1956), which then pro-
vided:
When any instrument of authorization is granted by the Commission with-
out a hearing . . . such grant shall remain subject to protest , . . for a period
of thirty days. . . . Any protest . .. shall contain such allegations of fact as
will show the protestant to be a party in interest, and shall specify with
particularity the facts relied upon by the protestant as showing that the grant
was improperly made or would otherwise not be in the public interest. The
Commission shall . . . render a decision making findings as to the sufficiency
of the protest in meeting the above requirements; and, where it so finds, shall
designate the application for hearings upon issues relating to all matters
specified in the protest . . . except with respect to such matters as to which
the Commission, after affording protestant an opportunity for oral argument,
finds, for reasons set forth in the decision, that, even if the facts alleged were
to be proven, no grounds for setting aside the grant are presented.
In 1959, Grossco applied for its permit to establish a 1 kilowatt, daytime only
station on 1550 kilocycles in the Hartford, Conn., area. WQXR petitioned to intervene
under § 309(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1085, as amended, ch.
879, § 7, 66 Stat. 715 (1952), which then provided:
If upon examination of any such application the Commission is unable
to make the finding specified in subsection (a), it shall forthwith notify the
applicant and other known parties in interest of the grounds and reasons for
its inability to make such finding. . . . The parties in interest, if any, who are
not notified by the Commission of its action with respect to a particular appli-
cation may acquire the status of a party . . . by filing a petition for inter-
vention showing the basis for their interest. . . . Any hearing subsequently
held upon such application shall be a full hearing in which the applicants and
all other parties in interest shall be permitted to participate .
Both § 309(b) and (c) were amended in 1960, 74 Stat. 889, 47 U.S.C. § 309 (Supp.
IV, 1959-62).
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